Rethinking the pragmatic systems biology and systems-theoretical  biology divide: toward a complexity-inspired epistemology of systems biomedicine by Kesić, Srdjan
1 
 
Rethinking the pragmatic systems biology and systems-theoretical  biology divide: 
toward a complexity-inspired epistemology of systems biomedicine 
 
Srdjan Kesić* 
Department of Neurophysiology, Institute for Biological Research “Siniša Stanković,” 
University of Belgrade, Despot Stefan Blvd. 142, 11060 Belgrade, Serbia 
 
 
* Corresponding author: 
Srdjan Kesić, PhD 
Assistant Research Professor,                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Department of Neurophysiology, 
Institute for Biological Research ―Siniša Stanković,‖ 
University of Belgrade, 
Despot Stefan Blvd., 142, 11060, 
Belgrade, Serbia.                                                                                                                  
 Tel: +381 61 3127580                
 E-mail:  srdjan.kesic@ibiss.bg.ac.rs 
 

















This paper examines some methodological and epistemological issues underlying the 
ongoing ―artificial‖ divide between pragmatic-systems biology and systems-theoretical 
biology. The pragmatic systems view of biology has encountered problems and constraints on 
its explanatory power because pragmatic systems biologists still tend to view systems as mere 
collections of parts, not as ―emergent realities‖ produced by adaptive interactions between the 
constituting components. As such, they are incapable of characterizing the higher-level 
biological phenomena adequately. The attempts of systems-theoretical biologists to explain 
these ―emergent realities‖ using mathematics also fail to produce satisfactory results.  
Given the increasing strategic importance of systems biology, both from theoretical 
and research perspectives, we suggest that additional epistemological and methodological 
insights into the possibility of further integration between traditional experimental studies and 
complex modeling are required. This integration will help to improve the currently 
underdeveloped pragmatic-systems biology and system-theoretical biology. 
The ―epistemology of complexity,‖ I contend, acts as a glue that connects and 
integrates different and sometimes opposing viewpoints, perspectives, streams, and practices, 
thus maintaining intellectual and research coherence of systems research of life. It allows 
scientists to shift the focus from traditional experimental research to integrated, modeling-
based holistic practices capable of providing a comprehensive knowledge of organizing 
principles of living systems. It also opens the possibility of the development of new practical 
and theoretical foundations of systems biology to build a better understanding of complex 
organismic functions.   
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In recent years there has been a growing interest in the use of systems biology in a 
wide variety of biomedical, biotechnical, and agricultural domains [1–4]. As shown by clear 
historiographical evidence, systems biology has actually resulted from the convergence of 
multiple theoretical and research pathways such as von Bertalanffy's general systems theory, 
cybernetics, Claude Shannon's theory of communication, the mathematical theory of systems 
of nonlinear differential equations, analysis of stability and bifurcations, deterministic chaos 
theory, cellular automata, complex adaptive theory, fractals, complexity, etc. It has made 
impressive progress in characterizing molecular interactions underlying multilevel structural 
and functional complexity of biological organisms indeed. While defining systems biology 
might be complicated, on the other hand, its emerging ―subfields‖ systems medicine and 
systems pharmacology significantly contributed to our overall understanding of diseases and 
their treatments [5].  
These fundamental and applied systems research projects differ in their aims, with 
some attempting a full ―top-down‖ characterization of all gene products (transcripts, proteins, 
and metabolites) [6, 7], and others trying to exploit systems biology in drug discovery [8, 9], 
and cognitive and neurodegenerative disease research [10, 11]. In recent years a great deal of 
attention has been paid to the computational systems biology and the applications of 
mathematics in systems research. Indeed, to describe the functional integration of biochemical 
networks and extend their insight into pathophysiology, systems biologists aim to construct 
complex computer models capable of simulating and predicting the behavior of biological 
systems in variable environmental conditions [12–14].  
Also, the attempts to integrate omics data are common threads that connect systems 
studies, as well as claims that mathematical-computational simulations (modeling) of these 
data can provide new insight into the functional and evolutionary dynamics of the living 
world. Despite the attention paid to the need of developing mathematical methods and 
computational tools capable of simulating dynamic molecular networks that affect whole-
organism physiology, these attempts have not yet yielded results that are satisfactory for 
explaining the higher-level ―emergent‖ properties of biological systems. In other words, the 
vast majority of working biologists is unreasonably afraid to creatively include complex 
systems modeling of higher-level phenomena into their research. 
We suggest that this lack of knowledge is the indirect consequence of a somewhat 
―artificial‖ divide between two streams in contemporary systems biology practice - dominant 
pragmatic systems biology and cybernetic-inspired systems-theoretical biology. This stance 
followed a line of scientists and philosophers such as O‘Malley and Dupré [15], and 
Mazzocchi [16]. These two streams are not theories or perspectives in competition, such as, 
for example, evolutionism and creationism, the chemical vs. electrical theory of synaptic 
transmission,  statistical mechanics approach based on atomism as proposed by Boltzmann 
and Gibbs vs. the positivism of Mach and Ostwald in the same period, relativity vs. quantum 
mechanics, etc. The fact that many systems biologists are currently engaged in producing 
experimental data and not putting them together back into systems is one of the reasons for 
fuelling this divide and slowing down the progress of entire systems biology. 
4 
 
Furthermore, both of these streams have their flaws. While it turns out that pragmatic 
systems biology is no more different than molecular biology except perhaps the total amount 
of data produced [17], thus far, for some authors, the excessive insistence on the mathematical 
explanation of biological phenomena fails to provide a deeper understanding of the multilevel 
complexity of living organisms [18]. But, most scholars would agree that systems biology 
does not make any sense without both of these streams. Therefore, to provide both pragmatic 
systems biology and systems-theoretical biology with strong systems principles and to further 
integrate them into unified systems biology, a long-term and sustainable solution is needed. 
However, before closing the limitations of the current divide, an agreement on the most 
important conceptual issues of system biology, including its future best methodology and 
epistemology, needs to be brought on daylight. This paper, therefore, aims to propose some 
possible conceptual directions that scientists and philosophers may choose to follow in their 
consideration of effective ways leading to the integration of systems biology. 
In this essay, we start by discussing the methodological, epistemological, and 
ontological assumptions made to make systems biology a prolific and pragmatic research 
approach. Next, we outline the difficulties that both pragmatic and system-theoretical 
biologists are attempting to understand biological systems have faced, especially in terms of 
linking lower molecular level with higher ―emergent‖ levels. Third, we examine differences 
between systems biology, cybernetics, and complexity. Finally, we show how the 
―epistemology of complexity‖ adds new insight into the study of biological systems, 
especially in search of ―physiological noise‖ in cancer biology.  
 
Pragmatic systems biology vs. systems-theoretical  biology 
As a research approach rather than being a discipline [3. 4], systems biology has often 
looked to other fields, including history and philosophy of science for insight. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in the ongoing attempts aimed to explain its historical roots. The debate 
about the rise of systems biology has been the outgrowth of broader discussions on the 
relationship between systems theory, nonlinear dynamics, and molecular biology. Westerhoff 
and Palsson [1] concluded this debate by theorizing that systems biology has two independent 
roots, molecular biology, and nonequilibrium thermodynamics. But what makes systems 
biology so powerful approach is that it depends on the simultaneous use of ―top-down‖ and 
―bottom-up‖ approaches as two significant ways of studying biological phenomena.  
In this respect, two crucial revolutions in our understanding of biomedical 
methodology inspired the emergence and the growth of systems biology. The first and 
perhaps the one that approaches systems view of life most literally relates to the shift from the 
dominant molecular-reductionist ―top-down‖ practice of biology to the holistic ―bottom-up‖ 
way of observing and explaining biological phenomena [3, 19]. For example, in a relevant 
article, The Nature of Systems Biology, Bruggeman and Westerhoff [19] have argued 
convincingly that ―bottom-up‖ systems biology deduces the functional properties on higher 
levels that could emerge from a subsystem that has been characterized using experimental 
molecular methods. It starts from the constitutive parts by formulating the interaction between 
the components (e.g., enzymatic process) and then integrates these formulations to predict 
system behavior.  
5 
 
The second significant methodological revolution relates to the development and 
successful application of high-throughput technologies in metabolomics, genomics, and 
proteomics [13]. This ―top-down‖ systems biology starts from the bird-eye view of the 
behavior of the system – from the whole – and then measure genome-wide or experimental 
proteome data, with the ultimate goal of discovering biological mechanisms closer to the 
bottom [19].  
Nonetheless, ―top-down‖ and ―bottom-up,‖ approaches to a living world shaped the 
contemporary study of biological organisms significantly. As suggested by philosophers 
O‘Malley and Dupré [15] and philosopher and biologists Mazzocchi [16], the practice of 
systems biology consists of two streams. One, which they called ―pragmatic systems biology‖ 
emphasize large-scale ―top-down‖ characterization of molecular constituents (omics studies) 
and their interactions, whereas the other, ―systems-theoretical ‖ biology emphasizes systems 
principles, mathematical biology, ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ modeling approaches. 
According to these authors, while pragmatic systems biologists still tend to view biological 
―systems as mere collection of parts, not as ontological (emergent realities), systems-
theoretical  biologists are instead committed to adopting a systemic view, that is to refer to 
systems‘ principles, as established in the tradition of systems theory by pioneers such as 
Wiener, Ashby, and von Bertalanffy [16, p.14]. ‖ In other words, pragmatic systems biologists 
do not radically differ from ―traditional‖ molecular biologists, except the fact that they are 
dealing with the ―plurality‖ of molecules and their large-scale interactions. This belief 
fostered the widespread understanding that systems biology could be distilled into molecular 
systems biology [17].  
On the contrary, systems-theoretical stream focused on mathematized systems biology 
stands against endless pragmatic efforts to ―molecularize‖ systems biology. Indeed, for 
systems biology to prove its worth, it is necessary that scientists shift their primary focus to 
systems-theoretical biology and computational systems biology. This shift would expand a 
collective awareness of the strengths of systems theory in providing a holistic understanding 
of the evolution and physiology of the living organisms. These days there are many voices in 
the scientific and philosophic community supporting this argument. For instance, according to 
Mazzocchi [16], the future of systems biology lies in systems-theoretical biology.  
There is another less obvious and more interdisciplinary-focused problem of systems 
biology, especially systems-theoretical biology, which prevents us not only to improve 
philosophical and historical knowledge of systems biology but also devising its future best 
research methodology. This problem concerns, I think, unclear and often neglected ties 
between systems biology and cybernetics, as well as the lack of understanding of the fact that 
cybernetics can improve theoretical and practical principles of systems biology. Although 
there is considerable knowledge that suggests common roots between cybernetics and 
systems-theoretical biology, it is my impression that even systems theoretical scientists quite 
often neglect the delicate relationship between these two exciting fields of research. The 
fundamental and correct assumptions here is that systems biology and cybernetics are two 
intertwined research fields and that the relationship between them is both a two-way street 
and also at a crossroads. Indeed, biology and especially organismic biology has been an 
essential inspiration for development in all aspects, including theoretical and experimental of 
cybernetics during the 20
th
 century [21]. Also, the system's principles proposed by Wiener, 
6 
 
Ashby, and von Bertalanffy, as well as nonlinear dynamics, are a common thread that runs 
through both cybernetics and systems-theoretical biology [16].  
However, the essential difference between cybernetics and systems biology is that, 
unlike systems biology, philosophy played a direct role in the recent development of 
cybernetics. Indeed, the junction between epistemology, first and second order cybernetics 
has led to the development of what is called ―epistemology of complexity,‖ which quite 
successfully deals with the astounding relationship between complex systems and the human 
observer [22–24]. My humble understanding is that it may now be the time for further 
philosophically-inspired development of cybernetics to be an inspiration for solving some of 
the arising research problems of systems biology. The way how cyberneticists and complexity 
scientists discuss complexity can say much about the spatiotemporal organization of complex 
biological organism, and thus indirectly about the core aspects of systems biology research 
process.  
Problems with systems biology: an insight from research practice 
In recent years, systems biologists have focused on the complete spatiotemporal 
characterization of interactions between molecular constituents of an organism and systems 
analysis of the ―molecular response‖ of a cell to external and internal perturbations [19]. In 
addition, systems researchers such as Bruggeman and Westerhoff [19] propose that 
experimental data must be integrated into mathematical models to enable knowledge-testing 
by formulating predictions (hypotheses), the discovery of new biological mechanisms, 
calculation of the system behavior obtained under external and internal perturbations, and 
finally, development of rational strategies for control and manipulation of cells. To 
accomplish all of these challenges, they believe, systems biology must integrate methods and 
approaches developed in other disciplines.  
However, there is another critical step that systems biologists should take before 
developing sophisticated mathematical and computational models. They must be able to 
provide reliable scientific data on the behavior of molecular components in various 
physiological and environmental conditions. For philosophers, this entails assumptions 
regarding a clear and defined experimental practice, yet this aspect of science production 
lacks rigorous mathematical instructions on how to make a scientific discovery. In this view, 
the development of new experimental techniques allowing for quantitative measurements and 
the proceeding level of knowledge in cell biology enables the application of mathematical 
modeling approaches for testing and validation of hypotheses and the prediction of new 
phenomena [25]. In other words, along with the rising relevance of mathematical modeling in 
systems biology, the importance of experimental design (DoE) issues increases; a proper 
experimental design enables a maximum informative analysis of the experimental data, 
whereas sophisticated analysis methods cannot compensate an improper design [25]. To my 
opinion, this issue is one of the most critical shortcomings of systems-theoretical biology, 
especially considering that some systems-theoretical biologists quite often neglect the 
importance of experimental data collection method and instead profusely emphasize 
mathematical modeling.  
However, the experimental methodology of systems biology touches upon pragmatic 
systems biology as well. The fundamental issue at stake here is one of the foundational 
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assumptions of pragmatic-systems biologists that the experimental work is quite powerful in 
discovering the truths about complex biological phenomena. But this practical reasoning is 
not without apparent limitations. For instance, in analyzing the living world, the biologist is 
constrained to focus on a fragment of "biological reality" which he/she arbitrarily isolates to 
define certain of its parameters, and/or to measure quantities, and /or to identify qualities [26]. 
This entrenched ―top-down‖ experimental routine may lead to a specific reduction of ―ontic 
complexity‖ of investigated objects (ontological reduction) and loss of vital information [26, 
27]. Stated differently, this widespread experimental routine widely embraced by pragmatic 
systems biologists fails to produce sufficient data on the adaptive and synergetic interactions 
between the molecular and cellular components underlying complex dynamics of living 
systems.  
The point here is not that pragmatic systems biologists have failed to provide an 
integrative understanding of function and evolution of organism which is, by the way, one of 
the primary goals of systems biology. Indeed, the majority of systems biologists who adopt a 
large-scale molecular research practice argue that the complete catalogizing of molecular 
constituents and their interactions may provide an ultimate understanding of life [3, 19]. They 
have a sense that sum is not just a collection of parts, but they lack appropriate conceptual and 
mathematical tools to address this ultimate goal of systems research.  
The primary problem of both pragmatic-systems biology and systems-theoretical 
biology has been a failure to appropriate the philosophical conception of ―emergence‖ 
scientifically. Much of this resistance to the genuinely scientific embracement of ―emergence‖ 
has its roots in both philosophy and more traditional science. As Ryan [28, p.2] argues 
          ―As the only commonality amongst the alternative positions is their failure to gain 
sufficient traction to generate consensus, their variety has only reinforced the status of 
emergence as an enigma.‖  
Ryan [28] also criticizes systems researchers for their adoption of the conception of 
―emergence‖ as a relation between levels, which have diverged to include a remarkable 
number of different positions. In this respect, philosophers and systems-theoretical scientists 
inadvertently accept the hierarchical theory of living organisms, which consequently fueled 
the existing disagreement about ―emergence." Quite understandably, there has been an 
ongoing aversion to the misconceptions of philosophical concepts such as ―emergence‖ in 
science, especially in experimental sciences. For example, according to philosophers David 
Chalmers [29] and Mark Bedau [30], there are two entirely different concepts of 
―emergence," ―strong‖ and ―weak," which often confuses scientists and philosophers. The 
former - most common in philosophical discussions since the 1920s and the British 
emergentist movement. According to Chalmers this form of ―emergence‖ suggests [29, p. 
244] ―that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level domain 
when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that 
phenomenon are not deductible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain.‖ Unlike 
―strong emergence,‖ ―weak emergence‖ concerns our cognitive and scientific inability to 
make epistemological predicaments about high-level phenomena [30].  
In contrast, some complexity scientists, for example, Ryan [28] and Bar‐Yam [31] 
who are firmly against ―hierarchical‖ thinking in biology, contend that systems scientists 
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should reflect upon ―emergence‖ and ―emergent properties‖ in terms of scope and resolution. 
Accordingly, first comes settings of the scope of the system, and then we are left to decide the 
resolution, which is usually straightforward. As far as systems theorists concerns, they are 
entrenched in believe that mathematized theory of ―emergence‖ can ultimately make this 
concept scientifically appropriated. As Ryan [28] and Bar‐Yam [31] argue, ―strong emergent 
properties‖ cannot be found in an individual state of the system but rather in the ensemble, or 
the relationship of a system to the environment. In other words, there is no ―strong 
emergence‖ when constraints that act on each component define the system. 
On the contrary, when constraints are known that act on collectives and not on parts 
does ―strong emergence‖ occur. In this view, the use of the mathematical study of multiscale 
variety is the evidence that forms of ―strong emergence‖ can be scientifically considered at 
least in case of parity bit systems [31]. In this study, Bar‐Yam [31] showed that it is possible 
to use mathematics to demonstrate ―strong emergence.‖ But, Bar‐Yam‘s research deals with 
the ―simple‖ complex system, and therefore, it is hard to say whether the multiscale variety 
can, in the same way, describe and predict the cases of ―strong emergence‖ found in the 
biological domain. However, there are models in neurobiology with a long history, such as the 
Hodgkin-Huxley (H-H) model of nerve excitability that is capable of predicting emergent 
neural dynamics. 
Nevertheless, ―bottom-up‖ model such as the H-H model and ―top-down‖ models of 
working memory and decision-making are studied by mathematics (theoretical neuroscience) 
and computational science (computational neuroscience) [32]. Although somewhat different, 
these two branches of neuroscience work in a complementary manner. According to Gerstner 
et al. [32, p. 60]: ―Theory has the advantage of providing a complete picture of the model 
behavior for all possible parameter settings, but analytical solutions are restricted to relatively 
simple models. The aim of theory is therefore to purify biological ideas to the bare minimum, 
so as to arrive at a ―toy model‖ that crystallizes a concept in a set of mathematical equations 
that can be fully understood. Simulations, in contrast, can be applied to all models, simplified 
as well as complex ones, but they can only sample the model behavior for a limited set of 
parameters‖. Stated differently, before the typical model-building process begins, scientists 
must refine their ideas in the theoretical and most likely philosophical domain. I would 
complement this view by adding that this process of model production must undoubtedly 
include the selection of valid experimental data. Therefore, the above assessment of the 
validity of the combined use of ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ models in the study of working 
memory and decision-making could be complemented with the conclusions on the importance 
of collecting valid and fresh experimental data on these processes (experimental 
neuroscience). 
As a computationally effective and straightforward model, H-H predicts quite 
successfully the propagation of action potentials, pacemaking activity or bistability, which are 
not a property of the individual components and processes (sodium, potassium, leakage 
permeation pathway, membrane capacitance) [32, 33]. It is based on the composition of ion 
channels, with specific time constants and gating dynamics that control the momentary state 
(open or closed) of a channel [32]. Although skepticism about its accuracy and usefulness has 
been raised over recent years [34], this model is still of vital importance in computational 
electrophysiology and neuroscience. In other words, the H-H model is ―bottom-up‖ detailed 
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biophysical model of a single neuron that allows scientists further development of 
macroscopic models of neural activity [32]. It is quite often combined with ―top-down‖ 
computational models to quantify the brain dynamics, which is operating on multiple time 
scales.  For, example, sophisticated modeling has provided a way to identify the connection 
between the simulation-based biophysical level and the phenomenological drift-diffusion 
models that were used to quantify decision-making behavioral data [32]. These above 
examples suggest that it is possible to predict specific ―emergent‖ biological phenomenon if 
the mathematical model of the system is accurately defined, and the behavior of low-level 
components is realistically recognized.  
In a similar vein, as part of Human Brain Project, Markram et al. [35] were able to 
reproduce in computational simulations a wide variety of spontaneous and evoked 
regenerative and non-regenerative firing patterns in ―in vitro‖ and ―in vivo‖ experiments, 
without any additional tuning of model parameters. This experiment was done on a neuronal 
microcircuit of a column in the rat primary sensory neocortex. 
Despite this strong evidence that mathematics, theoretical and computational 
neuroscience can demonstrate the ―biological emergence,‖ still some scholars and thinkers are 
not convinced in the unquestionable power of mathematics to explain the most if not all 
―emergent phenomena‖ in nature. According to them, in principle, mathematics is not 
necessary to demonstrate ―emergence.‖ The first and second laws of thermodynamics, for 
instance, can be considered as emergent, in the sense that they apply to macroscopic 
phenomena that do not depend on microscopic details. In other words, Kinetic theory of gases 
shows how they can emerge in the limit of large numbers of particles. Robert B. Laughlin 
[18], a Nobel Prize winner, systematizes this ―anti-mathematical‖ view of emergence in the 
book ―A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down.‖ He argues that 
although the myth of absolute power of mathematics is still entrenched in our culture, the 
transition to the Age of Emergence brings to an end this myth. In his opinion, mathematics 
fail to deal with ―emergent phenomena‖ adequately. Likewise, in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, there is currently a fierce controversy about whether there are genuine ―extra-
mathematical‖ explanations in science, which are independent of the physical description of 
natural phenomena [36–38]. This debate is certainly not in favor of those systems-theoretical 
scientists who claim that it is possible to explain ―emergence‖ in nature and society in a 
purely mathematical manner. Hence, the advocates of systems-theoretical stream in systems 
biology need to be aware of these shortcomings of mathematized systems biology. 
Further, Steven Weinberg [39], a Nobel Prize-winning physicist, stresses the 
importance of the pluralistic scientific research of ―emergence.‖ Weinberg in his well-
acclaimed book entitled ―Dreams of a Final Theory: The Scientist's Search for the Ultimate 
Laws of Nature‖ stated that the "reductionist" approach of finding a final theory of physics 
would by no means represent the end of special sciences such as biology. He supports his 
view by arguing that every hierarchical level of complexity will bring new ―emergent 
phenomena,‖ for whose understanding even a unified physics wouldn‘t be enough. He also 
claims that the level of resolution or detail in modeling complex systems needs to be limited. 
This stance complies with the requirement of the Occam razor or principle of parsimony. This 
philosophical principle states that one should not make more assumptions than the minimum 
needed or in a modeling context it is interpreted as: ―Simpler models should be favored over 
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more complex ones‖ (https://canworksmart.com/model-complexity/). In other words, this is a 
severe problem of modeling practice because the need for empirical or ―raw‖ data and 
datasets is significant not only for the understanding of complex phenomena but also for 
calibrating and validating the models for improved usefulness in predicting, forecasting, and 
managing the behavior of the system [40]. In addition to finding the right variables, finding 
the balance between avoiding both overfitting and oversimplification is the grand challenges 
of computer science and complex modeling [40]. 
Furthermore, Alexander Rosenberg [41, 42], a well-respected philosopher of science 
and biology, considers ―strong emergence‖ to be nothing more than an artifact of our limited 
cognitive, mathematical, and computational abilities. Although Rosenberg still maintains a 
strong reductionist view on the metaphysical ground, the possibility to reduce the sciences of 
complex (biological) systems to physics and chemistry turned, however, to be unfeasible. In 
Rosenberg‘s perspective, currently limited cognitive and computational abilities of human 
civilization, which prevent us of identifying universal laws in a biological domain such as 
those of physics or chemistry preclude the reduction of biology to physicochemical sciences. 
Similar to Weinberg, Rosenberg argues that the progress in physical sciences, at least for 
some time, will not lead to the end of sciences dealing with the astonishing complexity of a 
living world. My impression is that the consensus about ―weak emergence‖ among scientists 
and philosophers has been reached more or less. However, when it comes to the ―strong 
emergence,‖ things are much more complicated because even within the sciences of complex 
systems there is no consensus reached about how to understand and study ―emergent 
phenomena.‖ Therefore it is unlikely that there is even a minimum consensus among 
scientists and philosophers on this issue. 
From what we discussed so far, it is evident that both pragmatic and systems-
theoretical approaches have their drawbacks that affect the attempts to explaining the cases of 
―strong emergence.‖ It is, therefore, quite problematic to choose one over other perspectives 
as the basis of the future best methodology of systems biology. This is a diagnosis of the 
methodology of systems biology until the pragmatic-systems biologists start including 
systems principles in their work, and systems-theoretical biologists do not begin considering 
the importance of proper experimental design for modeling efforts. But, despite these 
shortcomings, there is a practical and theoretical need for both of these streams as well as for 
their more close ties through continuous integration. Of course, this integration has sense only 
in parallel with the elimination of their apparent limitations. 
The integration between, on the one hand, the ―top-down‖ experimental and 
computational approaches and ―bottom-up‖ computer systems biology on the other is the best 
way to continue with the further integration of systems biology. There are many ways how 
this general model of integration could be realized in practice. One of them is above 
described, combined use of ―top-down‖ and ―bottom-up‖ modeling in neuroscience. The 
other, proposed by Wukketis [20], is more of general and philosophical nature. He suggests 
that biology in the 21
st
 century must find the ways to overcome the historical and practical 
differences between analysis (―top-down‖) and synthesis (―bottom-up‖) and use them as 
complementary perspectives.  
Perhaps one of the most impressive attempt to bridge between these two ways of 
observing complex organisms is the ―theory of biological relativity,‖ which underlies that 
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there is no privileged level of causation in biology and that the biological functions are 
controlled simultaneously from higher and lower levels. Considering the multidirectional 
signal flow through biological hierarchies, Denis Noble [43] in an article entitled ―Claude 
Bernard, the first systems biologist, and the future of physiology,‖ proposed that there is no 
privileged level of causation in complex biological systems. The main conclusion of his 
exhaustive and in-depth analysis of system biology as a genuinely multilevel approach is that 
the insights obtained from the higher-level analysis (emergent properties) are even necessary 
to succeed at a lower level. In his view, in addition to reductionist ―bottom-up‖ causal chain, 
there is also the higher level of control of cell signaling and gene expression via ―downward 
causation.‖ In a way, studying the control and integration of the flow of information in 
biological systems must combine ―top-down‖ and ―bottom-up‖ approaches, in both 
computational and experimental domain.  
The ―epistemology of complexity‖ is another significant conceptual way that can 
integrate and accommodate ―top-down‖ and ―bottom-up‖ approaches for the discovery of 
―emergent processes and structures.‖ It relies on concept and methods devised in cybernetics 
and complexity such as self-organization, synergetics, complex adaptive theory, Maturana‘s 
and Varela‘s autopoiesis theory, second-order cybernetics (SOC), Morin‘s complex thinking, 
biological complementarity [23, 24, 44–48]. It highlights the importance of the observer 
systems role in the process of gathering knowledge and ―co-construction‖ of the world 
environment [22–24, 49, 50], and can be seen as another proposal to integrate system biology. 
The ―epistemology of complexity‖ may have the same role as the theory in neuroscience in 
Gerstner et al. [32] example. It has the potential to purify biological ideas to the bare 
minimum, to include the role of the observer in complex model building, and to ensure a 
simple model building with a set of mathematical equations that can be fully understood, and 
easily manipulated. It also has the potential to encourage the pragmatic - systems biologists to 
start putting the bricks together into a system.  
Considering all this, we argue that a new complexity-oriented epistemology is a 
starting point for re-questioning the problems of the systems research and convincing 
pragmatic biologists to be more open for the principles of system theory. But above all, it 
should stimulate systems-theoretical biologists to include the epistemological considerations 
into model-building processes. 
 
Systems biology from the perspective of cybernetics and complexity 
Systems research now requires a new epistemological perspective that embraces 
complexity considered in all of its theoretical and practical aspects. We submit that a step 
toward the integration of systems biology particularly leads through ―epistemology of 
complexity.‖ At the root of ―epistemology of complexity‖ is the cybernetic thinking and 
cybernetics, which both has a long history. First, it is hard to define cybernetics precisely. In 
its most general meaning cybernetics is a science that deals with the natural, technical and 
social process of change, which generates novelty, variety, and increase of organization; in 
one aspect all reality we experience is cybernetic [51]. Cybernetics is interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary because it provides the links between different knowledge domains and at 
the same time it abstracts the universal phenomena of control and communication, learning 
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and adaptation, self-organization and evolution from the many areas it adumbrates [21, 22, 51, 
52].  
Norbert Wiener, one of the founders of cybernetics, established the permanent links 
between biology and cybernetics by defining cybernetics as the science of ―control and 
communication in the animal and the machine‖ [21]. But, the word cybernetics dates back to 
ancient Greek and then later in modern times André-Marie Ampère used it in his essay on the 
―Philosophy of the Science‖ published in 1884 [53]. Cybernetics and General systems theory 
(one of the founders of General systems theory was Austrian biologists Karl Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy) are shown to be the same in motivation, requirements, characteristics, attributes, 
and behavior [53]. While cybernetics emphasized coordination, regulation, and control using 
feedback loops at the same time general systems theory attempted to elucidate profound 
principles underlying all types of systems whose components are linked by feedback loops 
[54]. Later on, advances in nonlinear dynamics in the second half of the 20th century 
influenced the further development of system theory, cybernetics, and complexity theory [54– 
56].  
One of the central issues of the science of cybernetics concerns the origin, 
maintenance, and evolution of complexity, which goes beyond the cybernetics itself [57]. We 
submit that it is reasonable to argue that complexity delves deep into the sphere of 
transdisciplinary attempts to formulate a complete knowledge of the world. It surprises its 
cybernetic roots in many ways and more profoundly emphasizes the discovery of ―emergent 
properties‖ across biological hierarchies. As history teaches us, complexity has actually 
resulted from the convergence of different research and theoretical pathways (e.g. nonlinear 
dynamics, cellular automata, self-organization, synergetics, Maturana‘s and Varela‘s 
autopoiesis theory, Morin‘s complex thinking, systems theory, etc.), which have dealt with 
issues at multiple levels (e.g., mathematical, computational, experimental, etc.).   
Furthermore, complexity is a theory, with accompanying mathematical models, about 
the behavior of systems [56]. Although cybernetics and complexity are two similar and 
interconnected fields of research, their difference may be reflected in the next paragraph [56, 
p.141–142]:  
            ―Complexity theory is related to both ecosystems and chaos theory, all three of which 
have been used to conceptualize biological, social, and psychological systems. 
However, to a greater extent than ecosystems theory, complexity theory attempts to 
explain why systems demonstrate emergent patterns that are greater than the summed 
effects of the original parts‖.  
Unlike complexity studies where the concept of ―emergence‖ plays a vital role, in cybernetics, 
historically speaking, much of it revolves around the terms ―positive and negative feedback 
control loops‖ [58]. Hence, complexity studies of the living world aim to reveal and describe 
the cases of both ―weak" and ―strong emergence,‖ whereas cybernetics is more concerned 
with the study of information flow within and throughout the system. 
While experimental and mathematical observations about concepts and theories of 
complexity are abundant, the exact processes underlying generation of complexity remains 
unclear [55]. There is no unified theory of complexity, as well [55]. Also, there are many 
subjectively-bounded measures of complexity. Indeed, Rosen [59] portrayed complexity as a 
system‘s characteristic corresponding to the difficulty in describing and modeling it: there is 
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no single account capable of fully explaining complex systems. Many different ways of 
investigating and interacting with them are instead needed. But what scientists and 
philosophers dealing with complexity have in common is the doctrine that the evolution of 
complexity, the production of the living world, and later intelligent human and his 
civilization- are the results of the same process of self-organization governed by the same 
general principles.  
Several concepts and theories of first-order cybernetics like synergetics, autopoiesis, 
or complex adaptive systems theory are proposed to explain and describe complex biological 
systems [44– 49]. But ―Morin's complex thinking‖ and the ―principle of complementarity‖ 
significantly influenced the formation of epistemological views on cybernetics. These two 
perspectives considerably deal with the ways of acquiring knowledge of the complex 
phenomena from the apparent theoretical and practical contradistinctions [23, 24, 49, 60].  
Starting from the development of cybernetics as a holistic tradition in the 1950s and 
1960s, it also becomes essential to address the role of an observer who distinguishes a system 
as such [22, p.1370]: 
           ―It was understood that the epistemology of the observer, how she, as a system comes 
to observe and know her world and the systems therein, was a complex matter.‖ 
This thinking has led to the development of SOC. An essential contribution to the 
development of SOC gave Heinz von Forester, Humberto Maturana, Ernst von Glasersfeld, 
Gordon Pask, and others [22]. The following description made by Scott [22, p.1372], best 
explains von Forester understanding of cybernetics: 
            ―He shows that as we draw on our science to explain how we ourselves work, we find 
ourselves in a hermeneutic circle of explanation.‖ In other words, first-order 
cybernetics and first-order systems are explained from the perspectives of second-
order cybernetics. 
 The epistemological scheme of the observer circularity in the domain of explanation 
includes the following steps [22, p.1374]:   
            (1) First order study of observed systems distinguishes systems that are energetically 
open and organizationally closed (autopoietic).  
            (2) Evolution and ontogenetic development of systems that observe and converse. 
            (3) Second order study of observing systems: the observer explains himself to himself. 
By taking into account these points, we might conclude that scientific knowledge is 
not directly taught and conceived as being a representation of an external and mind-
independent reality. In other words, our scientific descriptions of the complex world should be 
seen as ―world version‖ or better yet, these ―world version‖ are ―relative to us,‖ although it is 
possible that there is the ―world itself‖ independent from our existence. Therefore, at this 
point, it is clear why the epistemological consideration of ―emergence‖ (weak emergence) 
precedes the ontological and scientific study of it. This critical primacy of epistemological 
reflection points purposely to the shortcomings of our cognitive abilities, and perhaps it may 
reveal the paths that need to be taken to improve our knowledge of the ―world itself.‖ For 
these reasons, the ―epistemology of complexity‖ somehow reflects our constant need to return 
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to fundamental philosophical aspects underlying the formation and growth of scientific 
knowledge. 
Furthermore, as indicated, a better understanding of the coupling of the observer to the 
observed in biology is possible from the perspective of ―Morin‘s complex thinking‖ that 
invokes epistemological scheme of the observer circularity [23, 24, 49, 60]. What is important 
here is that ―complex thinking‖ does not necessarily imply that ―everything is complex,‖ 
meaning ‗what cannot be understood.‖ In other words, ―complex thinking‖ allow scientists to 
articulate all sort on first sight distinct concepts and approaches such as the whole and the 
parts, as well to distinguish complex from complicated [61]. It allows combination several 
factors at the same time, ―Where principles of regulation and non-equilibrium are combined, 
where contingency and determinism, order and disorder are; where levels of the organization 
and nonlinear dynamics can be identified by feedback between the levels [61, p. 3].‖ It seems 
that this perspective is promising, in integrating between opposites such as ―holism‖ and 
―reductionism,‖ ―top-down,‖ and ―bottom-up‖ systems biology, pragmatic-systems biology, 
and systems-theoretical biology. However, one can object that ―Morin‘s complex thinking‖ is 
a more conceptual approach rather than a scientific method. But, here everything is about 
reconciliation between concepts, and therefore, the use of theoretical tools is also 
understandable. But such a conceptual strategy must be reflected directly on the biomedical 
research-practice itself. To provide this translation into research, let us discuss what the 
connections between ―epistemology of complexity‖ and systems biology are. 
 
Toward an epistemology of complexity in systems biology 
 Knowledge as something that has meaning for a subject (knowledge is our experience 
of the world that cannot be symmetrical, pure, or complete) is always contextualized, in a 
sense that it is always bounded to boundaries, or to our ways of producing descriptions when 
dealing with complex systems [50, 62]. For example, hypothetically speaking, if scientists had 
detailed knowledge of the fertilized egg, including the concentrations and locations of 
transcription factors and the relevant epigenetic influences, we could imagine solving the 
ultimate puzzle of development by devising equation involving gene expression patterns 
determined by both the genome and epigenome [63]. However, we cannot yet characterize all 
the relevant concentrations of transcription factors and epigenetic influences; and in the case 
that we could provide this information, there are ―boundary conditions,‖ which determines the 
context of expression of these factors and their activity within the cell, tissues, and organs 
[54]. In other words, the ―boundary conditions‖ are set by the higher level and determining 
those conditions at that level either by measurement or by computation can enable them to be 
inserted into the equations at the lower level [63]. Even more so, the notion of ―boundary 
conditions‖ remind me of Davies notion of the epigenome as useful but virtual objects as 
there is no ‗command and control center,‘ or instructions etched into a physical system, from 
which epigenetic control ultimately emanates [64]. Hence, it is challenging to qualitatively 
determine boundary conditions (to list them all), not to mention their small and large 
variations that may affect the behavior of molecular interaction network topology. 
Furthermore, complex systems have a history, and without taking their history and 
context into account, they cannot be adequately understood [62]. For complex systems, for 
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which the boundaries of knowledge (boundary conditions) are hard to set, knowledge comes 
to be in a dynamic network of interactions (in a state of constant transformation) without 
distinctive borders - this has to do with nonlinear dynamical interactions in a complex open 
system as a result of autopoiesis (self-production of living systems) process [62]. In other 
words, there are no accurate or perfect representations of an open system, which is more 
straightforward than the system itself (this is so-called the problem of boundaries). The fact is 
that when we build representations of biological systems (by employing models and nonlinear 
measures), we are forced to leave many things out; these omissions are nonlinear, and 
therefore it is hard to predict their magnitude [62].  
Luisa Damiano [50] presents a compelling rational-based view of acquiring 
knowledge of the complexity from the research practice itself. What she emphasizes is the 
difference between ―theoretical problem‖ and ―epistemological problem‖ of complexity 
research. The theoretical problem requires ―theoretical innovations‖; it requires ―the 
elaboration of models able to explain how nature can disobey the old reductionist postulate 
―the whole is the sum of its part‖ [50, p. 274]. 
In contrast, ―epistemological problem‖ requires an epistemological innovation [50, p.  274]:  
          ―The suspension and, possibly, the substitution of the classical objectivist principle 
which relates the values of scientific descriptions to the characterization of a reality 
that is free from subjective influence.‖  
What is emphasized by Damiano is not the revolutionary role of SOC in describing 
―emergent properties," but rather a greater involvement of ―epistemology of complexity‖ 
together with experimental sciences and mathematics to represent, explain and reproduce 
dynamic behavior of complex biological systems. What one might consider from Damiano‘s 
distinction is that systems biology at first should resolve its ―theoretical problem‖ before 
moving on to discuss its more serious ―epistemological problem.‖ This common practice 
somehow belongs to the traditional school of thought in terms of how to solve scientific 
problems. According to this conventional reasoning, to be able to discuss epistemological 
issues of systems biology properly, we should first address and explain its experimental, 
mathematical, and computational problems, and then implement them into research practice. 
However, considering the epistemological scheme of the observer circularity in the domain of 
explanation, one can expect the resolution of experimental, mathematical, and computational 
issues only at the outset of the proper consideration of ―epistemological problem.‖ In other 
words, back to the scientific and philosophical basis of the possibilities of human knowledge 
of complexity is the right way to establish trustworthy and productive pragmatic and systems-
theoretical biomedical research practice. 
  
 
Practical implications: epistemology of complexity of cancer research 
The main question is how to use the ―epistemology of complexity‖ to settle between 
conceptual and research contradictions found throughout systems biomedicine? In principle, 
comprehensive knowledge of complexity, as Cilliers [62] suggests, should be in the first place 
defined by dialectical relationship (beyond the object/subject dichotomy) between knowledge 
and the system within which this knowledge is constituted. Similarly, Mazzocchi [23], Theise 
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and Kafatos [60] propose that the principle of complementarity, used initially in quantum 
mechanics, can successfully bridge between opposing perspectives and epistemological 
limitations associated with biomedical research. With this in mind, the gap between "weak 
emergence" and ―strong emergence‖ and ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ analysis, pragmatic-
systems practice and systems-theoretical practice should be closed at the interface between 
the complex biological system and the knowledge of the biomedical researcher. How can this 
be applied and refined in biomedical practice? 
SOC provides valuable conceptual resources for system biology and can provide a 
completely new scientific and even philosophical perspective on how we approach 
information and causality in cancer biology, for example. For someone to determine whether 
the data from a particular level are relevant or irrelevant for understanding the phenomenon 
investigated, one must consider the context and the ways of producing descriptions of 
information content. In other words, one must be able to provide clear evidence that the 
measured ―bottom-up‖ or ―top-down‖ information is not a nonlinear artifact of measuring 
process itself. To support this thesis, it would be useful to stress that environmental factors 
(―boundary conditions‖) are also inevitable in the process of cancer treatment, such as the 
temperature, radiations, chemical drugs, the immunological state of the host, individual 
quality of life factors, etc. [65–67]. So, it is essential to consider the probable influences of the 
different kinds of stochastic fluctuations on the process of cancerogenesis before the start of 
the therapy [66].  
Current approaches to detect stochastic fluctuations information flow pretty much rely 
on the analytical derivation of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) from stochastic resonance 
estimation techniques. Using this approach, Li et al. [66] showed that weak environmental 
fluctuations could induce the extinction of tumor cells in the subthreshold periodic treatment. 
But, the authors of this study are cautious in their conclusion as the environmental fluctuations 
could also induce the appearance of stochastic resonance effect which is not beneficial to the 
extinction of tumor cells in the process of treatment. According to these authors, if the 
positional fluctuations are included in the equation, then it will enhance the stochastic 
resonance effect; however, the correlation length of positional fluctuations will play a decisive 
role during the treatment of cancer.  
What can we conclude from this example? The history and context (the type of cancer, 
previous treatment, quality of life, etc.) play a significant role in estimating the effect of 
stochastic fluctuations on cancer treatment. Given that there are a large number of central and 
internal physiological and genetic factors affecting the treatment of cancer, it is challenging in 
this situation to evaluate the flow of stochastic fluctuation and its relation to positional 
variations. However, the method itself that provides the knowledge of the effects of stochastic 
change and noise on complex systems, including biological organisms, raises many questions. 
The stochastic resonance (SR), extensively studied by physicists in recent decades, has been 
described in a plethora of physical and biological systems, including the central nervous 
system [68]. It occurs when increases in levels of unpredictable fluctuations such as random 
noise cause an increase in a metric of the quality of signal transmission, or detection 
performance, rather than a decrease due to the nonlinearity of system and parameter ranges 
being ‗‗suboptimal‘‘ [68].  
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As we mentioned, biologists and physicists quite often use signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
to quantify stochastic resonance (see 66). But according to credible scholars such as 
McDonell and Abbot [68], SNR is unlikely to be a useful way of quantifying SR in biology 
since it is a measure designed for linear systems and artificial electronic systems. If instead 
biologists want to prove that biological function may rely on random noise, it makes more 
sense to measure variations in function with changing internal noise level. McDonell and 
Abbot [68] further criticize the use of SR in biomedical research. I will mention only a few 
critics they raise. The first criticism relates to our limited methodological capacity to devise 
an experiment that can undoubtedly reveal intrinsic stochastic resonance by removing 
naturally occurring healthy variability and thus demonstrating that function is impaired solely 
due to that removal.  
The second critique stresses the epistemological problems of explaining positive noise 
because if noise benefits are found, then that means that an alternative, superior, non-noisy 
mechanism is not efficiently feasible or robust. This fact implies that our current knowledge 
of dominantly non-noisy cellular mechanism should be reconsidered from the ground up. 
Their third critique suggests that use of SR as a signal-processing strategy in its own right is 
misleading because it confuses cause with effect [68, p.7]:  
          ―In this circumstance, the system itself is capable of SR, and the technique that is 
employed is that of modifying the noise intensity.‖ 
Now, after this consideration, it becomes clearer why many complexity theorists such 
as Mazzocchi [23] insists on Morin‘s complex thinking as a promising theoretical tool that 
can help unravel the biological role of noise. The search for ―positive‖ or ―constructive― 
meaning of noise makes sense only if the role of the observer (experimenter) and his 
epistemological status is included in the broader ―noise‖ equation. Even then, boundaries of 
knowledge that determine the biological effects of noise are hard to understand due to 
nonlinear dynamical interactions in a complex open system. In other words, there are no 
accurate or perfect representations of noise and SR in, for example, cancer biology, which is 
more straightforward than the system itself. But the truth is that when the ―epistemology of 
complexity‖ is employed, then we can, at least, be aware of the necessity of distinguishing 
between naturally occurring healthy variability and experimentally-generated noise. In other 
words, if we include epistemology in the research agenda, we can at least look at the 
limitations of the existing cognitive, experimental and mathematical techniques for the study 
of the origin, source, and physiological significance of noise. This practice would make it 
possible to discriminate between the biologically relevant effects of stochastic fluctuation and 




Mainstream systems biology has adopted a model of ―expanded‖ molecular biology. 
For this and other reasons, reductionist ―top-down‘ research approach and reductive 
explanation are still dominant in contemporary biomedicine. As De Vreese et al. [69] notes, 
reductionist methodological practice is still prevailing in medicine, and medical research and 
practice is not fully and genuinely explanatory pluralist yet. This legacy in systems biology 
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dates back to one of its roots, molecular biology and scientific methodology meant adopting a 
reductionist ―top-down‖ research program in science. There can be no doubt that there are 
many fundamental aspects of systems biology, which is made clear by utilizing a reductionist 
methodology [3, 19].  
Advocates of systems-theoretical biology and holistic understanding of life have been 
confronted with questions of the value of reductionist research program, implying that the 
essence of systems biology relegates their work outside the framework of molecular systems 
biology. These critiques miss the point of the importance of such large scale pragmatic 
molecular studies precisely because they assume that the mathematically-based model-driven 
approach is capable of discovering mechanisms operating at higher levels. But, the efforts to 
mathematically describe and predict ―ontological realities‖ at higher levels (―strong 
emergence‖) also did not produce a consensus on a universal mathematical theory of 
emergence. This doesn‘t mean that there are no models in systems biology and neuroscience 
that cannot predict and describe certain ―emergent phenomena.‖ In this regard, it is sufficient 
to look at the value of the H-H model that describes the overall single-neuron activity in 
computational electrophysiology [32, 33]. It, therefore, seems that both streams have their 
advantages and disadvantages. But I would say that there is no symmetry in this diagnosis 
because the essence of system biology lies primarily in the theoretical landscape of systems 
science [15, 16]. That is, the system principles should ―absorb‖ the pragmatic stream in 
systems biology. And not the way around.  
Consequently, we must consider carefully projecting the future of systems biology 
from the angle of a non-critical narrative that does not perceive the strengths and weaknesses 
of the current experimental and modeling research practice. We suggest that further 
integration and some agreed complementarity between these two streams are of essential 
importance for the future progress of systems biology. On this path, a better and more detailed 
view of the relationship between cybernetics and system biology can lead us in search of 
successful bridging principles that will unite contemporary systems research efforts. 
I have concluded that pragmatic-systems biologists and systems-theoretical biologists 
at first focus their attention to ―theoretical problem‖ and ―theoretical innovation.‖ 
Unfortunately, this sequence of events only amplifies the existing ―epistemological problem‖ 
of complexity research. By contrast, ―epistemology of complexity‖ moves in the opposite 
direction, and the first place addresses important knowledge-related aspects underlying 
conceptual and research distinctions that could inhibit the proper practical implementation of 
"theoretical innovation." In this way, ―epistemology of complexity‖ maintains the epistemic 
reliability of systems research just like in our example of noise in cancer biology. But above 
all, it creates preconditions necessary for the development and implementation of 
sophisticated mathematical and computational models (―theoretical innovations‖) powerful 
enough to deal with the elusive ―emergent principles and properties.‖ Indeed, to explain the 
emergence scientifically, the inclusion of the notion of an observer in definition and formal 
models is needed. For example, Baas and Emmeche [70] recognized and included the role of 
the observer in their formal mathematical framework for modeling ―emergent phenomena.‖ 
So what we see in this example is that the complexity-inspired ―epistemological innovation‖ 
can be reliably used to advance ―theoretical innovation.‖ Therefore, I think that the general 
idea of cybernetics, in particular, second-order cybernetics and ―epistemology of complexity,‖ 
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can improve the multilevel linear and non-linear modeling methodology used in systems 
research of life. 
 However, I have only sketched the possibility of using ―epistemology of complexity‖ 
in systems biology and systems medicine. In general, a problem with the ―epistemology of 
complexity‖ is sometimes imprecise definition of how it can improve the acquisition of the 
knowledge in research practice, but this is a circumstance to be expected with freshly 
introduced concepts whose potential range of applications is still to be explored. To provide 
accurate analyses of this notion I have presented, the basic idea to approach systems biology 
here must be refined against concrete examples of biomedical practice. More detailed studies 
are needed to improve our understanding of how ―epistemology of complexity‖ can solve 
persistent problems of current systems-based biomedicine. 
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